Mark Fisher: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary—I know that she appreciates the importance of the collection and the archive, not only nationally but internationally. With those of Spode and Wedgwood, it is one of the great ceramics industry archives, with all the designs of great designers such as Christopher Dresser. It would be a tragedy if it were broken up, so I urge my hon. Friend to take whatever steps she can to persuade KPS. I believe that the company is well intentioned, but that support and pressure from Her Majesty's Government are needed to stress the extreme importance of keeping the archive together, not only in one piece, as one archive, but in Britain, especially north Staffordshire.

Barbara Follett: I understand the concern of my hon. Friend, as one of the Members for Luton. In fact, local authorities have quite wide powers in that area. They also work with the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council, and they have money for that. We have to encourage local authorities to be aware of the value of something like that to local identity and local tourism.

Jeff Ennis: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, but given the current economic situation does he agree that now must be the time to modernise the future of horse racing, by replacing the out-of-date levy system with a new system that is fit for the 21st century? That can be achieved only by all sections of the racing industry working together constructively to get that system off the ground.

Jeremy Hunt: May I first congratulate the Secretary of State on the success of his team in yesterday's FA cup semi-final?
	The right hon. Gentleman sent me a letter just before Christmas refuting the claims that I had made about the decline in funding for grass-roots and community sport—claims that have been echoed today by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone). Just a few weeks ago, however, the Secretary of State supplied me with parliamentary answers that confirm precisely the fact that there has been a dramatic fall in lottery funding for grass-roots and community sport. Which of his two answers is correct?

Andy Burnham: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his congratulations. It was a marvellous day at Wembley yesterday, and I apologise for being a touch croaky today. It is not always possible to be an impartial Secretary of State, and that has produced a bit of a rift in the Department today, although we are patching things up as best we can.
	I will give the shadow Secretary of State a similar response to that I have just given the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone). The figures that he cites not only miss out the funding from the Big Lottery Fund, significant sums of which have gone into grass-roots sport, but exclude funding provided by the Department for Children, Schools and Families in accordance with the PE and school sports strategy, which the DCSF and my Department co-sponsor. We are now talking about £200 million a year in that regard, so I hope that, if we are to have a debate about funding for sport, we can put all the facts on the table and take into account all the investment that is going into grass-roots and school sport. If I have heard the shadow Chancellor correctly in recent times, I must conclude that if he were standing where I am now, he would be having to explain to the House on what level he was cutting sport funding. I understand that it is Conservative policy to cut Department for Culture, Media and Sport spending now, this year, and we would be interested to hear where the axe would fall on grass-roots sport.

Jeremy Hunt: If we are to believe what we read in the papers this morning, Government briefings suggest that it is the Chancellor, not the shadow Chancellor, who is talking about spending cuts of £15 billion. The last Conservative Government set up the lottery precisely in order to support grass-roots sports, the arts and our heritage when times are tough. Is not the reason that funding for grass-roots sport has halved under the right hon. Gentleman's Government the appalling way in which the Government have managed the national lottery, in particular by diverting more than £1 billion to supporting Government spending programmes, so that, in the crucial run-up to 2012, when we want more people to be able to enjoy community sport, fewer people will actually be able to do so?

Phyllis Starkey: I am anxious that the criteria—whatever they are—do not discriminate against newer cities such as my own, Milton Keynes. I urge my right hon. Friend to ensure that the criteria allow a bid, which could build on the marriage of Milton Keynes' history with the varied heritage of the large numbers of communities that have moved into the city from elsewhere in the UK and from abroad.

Hugh Robertson: The European Investment Bank website has revealed that an application for a £255-million loan for the athletes' village was lodged in February and approved on 7 April. Given that this is the first that many of us have heard of the matter, is the Minister able to throw some more light on the subject today? In particular, will she tell us at what interest rate the loan was agreed, what conditions govern that loan, and what their effect will be on the Olympic balance sheet?

Christopher Huhne: I thank the Home Secretary for advance sight of her statement. She will be aware of the press reports that some of the arrests were weeks' premature, and she said in her statement that the fact that the papers were inadvertently made public did not make any difference to the decision to carry out arrests, but that it simply changed the timing. Will she confirm that all those who were going to be arrested were arrested, and that all those who were arrested were going to be arrested within hours? Has any lasting damage been done as a result of Assistant Commissioner Quick's indiscretion?
	On the issue of bogus colleges, will the Home Secretary tell us the latest state of play on the validation of colleges? Should validation be given a higher priority in the light of those arrests, and can she estimate how many students who are in this country attending, or perhaps not attending, have not been validated?
	On Pakistan, greater co-operation is welcome; the Home Secretary says that there are now greater checks on the qualifications of applicants. Can she give us more detail on what else is being done to improve checks on Pakistani nationals who come here to study and work? On the Security Industry Authority, the Home Secretary points out that there is a requirement for Criminal Records Bureau checks—those, of course, relate to UK crime. However, in these cases of foreign nationals, what steps are being taken to ensure criminal record checks in the country of origin? Surely that is the key point.
	We still cannot be sure that someone who is granted a student visa will leave when it expires; thanks to the last Conservative Government, we abolished exit checks. Can the Home Secretary say how effective exit checks are in the principal ports used particularly by Pakistani students? What estimate can she give on likely over-stayers, and how many Pakistani students who have come here in the past 10 years can definitely be said to have returned home? How many cannot be accounted for?

Jacqui Smith: As the right hon. and learned Gentleman quotes—or purports to quote—the Director of Public Prosecutions, perhaps it would be helpful if I pointed him to paragraph 30 of the DPP's lengthy statement of last week, where he says:
	"One of the principal concerns at the Home Office was that whoever was responsible for the leaks in question may have had access to Ministerial papers and that there was a potential risk that highly sensitive material relating to national security might be disclosed. This damage should not be underestimated and once the pattern of leaks was established in this case, it was inevitable that a police investigation would follow."
	That closely mirrors the points that I have made in this House when answering questions at the Dispatch Box and in front of the Home Affairs Committee.

Jacqui Smith: As I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware, it would be well nigh impossible to know that statistic. However, it is important for us to know whether someone who has overstayed is still in the country or whether they have left. It is precisely for that purpose that we are rolling out the e-borders programme, which is opposed by Conservative Members.

Defence Procurement

James Arbuthnot: The Minister says that priority will be given to the FRES Scout vehicle, as the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) has said before. May we have an indication of the time scale in which that vehicle will come on stream? This FRES story has been going on for a little bit now.

Bob Ainsworth: We fall straight into a trap when we talk about tranche 3A and tranche 3B of Typhoon and nobody other than ourselves understands what anybody is talking about. We are in discussions with our partners about this tranche of aircraft, but I am not able to make an announcement on that at the moment and I am sorry to have to say that to the hon. Gentleman. We will make an announcement on our intentions to buy tranche 3 as soon as we can and we will try to keep the House informed on that.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman describes a hypothetical situation, which would include the questions of whether there would be a gap and of how big that gap would be, so I cannot answer his question. We will come to the House, as I said, and we will inform people as soon as we can about the situation regarding tranche 3 of the Typhoon.
	High-end equipment, such as that which we have been talking about, can be used very effectively across the spectrum of conflict. That is borne out by the experience of current operations. The armed forces are using equipment designed with very different theatres in mind for roles for which they were not originally intended. Such equipment includes the Tornado, which was bought as a deep-attack bomber but is employed in Iraq for close air support and will soon perform the same role in Afghanistan. However, making the right decisions about the equipment that we need is only one side of the equation. The other side involves ensuring that when we go on to procure equipment, we procure it as efficiently and effectively as possible.
	Delivering equipment programmes has always been challenging. In 1958, the then Ministry of Supply estimated that defence equipment cost 2.8 times as much as forecast, so delays, slippages and cost overruns are nothing new, nor are these difficulties something with which the UK alone struggles. In his budget speech, Secretary Gates said:
	"The perennial procurement and contracting cycle—going back many decades—of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an end."

Nicholas Soames: I agree with the Minister and accept the point that he is making—procurement is not easy, and many other countries have great difficulties—but there is no need for us to have those great difficulties. American defence procurement is on a scale vastly bigger than ours, vastly more complicated and vastly more complex, covering many more areas and systems. What we choose to require of our desperately small armed forces should not be as complicated and difficult as it is. The Government need to make things run much better, whichever Government they are.

Richard Benyon: Previous generations have warned the House about perceived threats, and have been shouted down, not least Winston Churchill in 1930s, when he was in the House and talked about the need to rearm. If we look at the perceived threat of cyber-attack, which has manifested itself in countries such as Estonia—and we have recently heard how China has indulged in cyber-technology that could be used to attack countries in the west such as the UK—what assurances can the Minister give the House that he understands that threat and has built it into his procurement policies?

Quentin Davies: The hon. Gentleman says, "Rubbish!" but he is going to have to withdraw that.

Gerald Howarth: Of course that is the position. We do not know what the numbers are—we have not had access to the books. I am telling the hon. Lady and the House what my right hon. Friend the shadow Chancellor is proposing as we speak.
	I think that you will require us to move on, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because there is much ground to cover. The Minister covered a lot, and I want to do the same. Sticking to financial matters, in another twist of creative accounting the Government have embarked on an expensive programme of private finance initiative projects. My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) referred to the largest, the future strategic tanker aircraft programme to meet our requirement for transport and air-to-air refuelling, which will cost some £13 billion over 27 years. The defence training review will apparently cost some £10 billion over a similar period, and other PFI projects for flying training and helicopter search and rescue will cost about £10 billion. Those will be contractual commitments, reducing the proportion of the defence budget available for ministerial discretionary spending. Not content with screwing up their own budget, this Government want to saddle the next Conservative Government with Labour's debts. There is a fundamental flaw in the Government's approach.

Willie Rennie: In every defence debate we rightly pay tribute to the armed forces and the service that they give to the nation, and it is even more important for us to do that in the context of defence procurement. In my view, however, the best tribute that the House could pay our troops would be to provide them with the equipment that they deserve and desperately need. I believe that the Government are forcing the troops to change their mentality from "can do" to "make do", and that there is an urgent necessity for the Government to review what they are asking our troops to do in the front line when their circumstances are so challenging.
	It is well over a year since I was a member of the Defence Committee. Just before I left, we took evidence from the then new defence procurement Minister, Lady Taylor. She replaced the highly respected Lord Drayson when he decided to go off and race cars around the desert. I understand that he is now back at the Cabinet table. Lord Drayson was determined to push through a second edition of the defence industrial strategy as a means of further strengthening the relationship between industry and Government, but as soon as Lady Taylor secured her seat she slammed on the brakes, saying that it was time to reflect and consider before publication. Surely a year is more than enough time in which to deliberate on whether we need a second defence industrial strategy. Lady Taylor was subsequently punted to the right, and we now have a new defence procurement Minister. Perhaps he can enlighten us on when we shall see a new strategy, because we desperately need one.
	The Government's defence procurement strategy has been characterised by overblown commitments to the thousands of workers in dockyards and factories across the United Kingdom. As with their commitments in regard to public services, education and the health service, their delivery has fallen well short of expectations. I suppose that it is much better than the delivery under the Tory years, but that is not saying much. There have been extensive delays, overruns and cuts, and the workers have been let down badly by the present Government.
	Let me give some examples. Although 12 type 45 destroyers were promised, the number has been halved to six, yet the costs have risen dramatically. The Astute submarine is £1 billion over budget. The Chinook conversion, initiated by the Conservatives, will be delayed by up to nine years, with an extra cost of £200 million. The Nimrod MRA4 is eight years behind schedule and £1 billion over budget, which is leaving dangerous planes in the air and costing lives.

Willie Rennie: Nothing wakes Tories from their sleep more effectively than the word "Europe"; they start foaming at the mouth at every opportunity when we mention it. It is absolutely clear that we need to get more from our European allies, but the hon. Gentleman should accept that although we have not had the commitment that we should have had from some of them, there are lots of countries, such as Denmark, who have given lots of troops to serve in Afghanistan. Some countries need to do more, but we should not ditch the principle just because we do not get the commitments we need from all countries. I shall move on, however, because I do not want to get the Conservatives too excited by mentioning Europe too often.
	Like a bolt from the blue, during the recess the Government announced another set of job cuts at the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency, including at Crombie in my constituency. That was unexpected, as another review is currently under way, inspired by the Treasury. When the Minister winds up, will he explain why we have had another set of job cuts, as, unsurprisingly, morale is extremely low in the DSDA? Will he also tell us about the Treasury-inspired review, which I understand the MOD did not know about before the Treasury announced it? Is the MOD involved in that review and debate, and when can we expect to have some kind of answer?
	Nuclear non-proliferation merits an investment of volumes of political capital. Over the next year, we have a tremendous window of opportunity in advance of the non-proliferation treaty talks. With President Obama impressively opening doors that have been padlocked shut for years, there is an opportunity to have serious and effective engagement with a range of countries, including the likes of Russia, Iran, North Korea and China, on a range of global matters, with nuclear weapons at the top of the list. Ultimately, nuclear non-proliferation is a political issue. As it requires political, rather than military, solutions, the signals we send in advance of those talks have to be strong and clear. This is not a time for vacuous comments or commitments that any junior student would see through in seconds.
	The Prime Minister deserves some credit for investing time and effort on this agenda. He has made a number of high-profile keynote contributions, yet by announcing that the number of missile tubes in the replacement submarines will be cut from 16 to 12, he simply reinforced the status quo. It was a vacuous comment that was not appreciated by his audience and left the negotiators from other countries bemused.
	Will the Minister confirm whether we will have four or three submarines for the replacement Trident, because Lord Malloch-Brown indicated in another place that we could no longer keep up a continuous sea deterrent with only three submarines? Will the Minister clarify whether we will have four? He is looking puzzled about this; perhaps he should check his colleague's comments in  Hansard as he made a clear statement that we could no longer follow through on the commitment made in 2006 that we might have three replacement submarines rather than four. We need clarification on that because it was only about two and a half years ago that we agreed that there could be a commitment to cut the number to three, and I am sure that many hon. Members cast their vote on that basis. We need clarification on why the decision has, apparently, been made, and on what basis.
	I agreed with the Prime Minister when he said recently:
	"We cannot expect to successfully exercise moral and political leadership in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons if we ourselves do not demonstrate leadership on the question of the disarmament of our own weapons."
	However, the signal we sent out in 2006, when we agreed to renew the fleet of submarines and to enter into an agreement with the US on new missiles, was destructive. That decision need not have been made at that time; it was never necessary to make all the decisions back in 2006. Whatever the reasons for doing so were—such as, perhaps, support from the previous Prime Minister for the current Prime Minister—it was not necessary to make those decisions at that time, and it sends a message out to all those who will attend the NPT talks next year that we have no intention of giving up our nuclear deterrent until at least the middle of the century. I accept all the arguments about industrial drum beat and the necessary lead time for research, development and design, but making a full and, effectively, final decision on Trident six years before it was absolutely essential was unnecessary and reckless. We could by all means have made some of the decisions—the essential ones—at an earlier stage, but with main gate at around 2014, the big decision only needed to be made in advance of that. In fact, we should have a debate at initial gate too, rather than the announcement being snuck out in a recess.

Linda Gilroy: It is a pleasure to follow previous contributors, who have quoted extensively from the Defence Committee report on equipment. I want to mention a few good things that the Committee found, before highlighting some of our criticisms, and then I shall talk about what some of that means for my constituency.
	Not everything that we had to say about the Ministry of Defence's procurement policy was bad, by any means. We remarked on the delivery of equipment and supplies to Iraq and Afghanistan in very challenging circumstances. In particular, our report commends the urgent operational requirements system as "highly effective" in meeting rapidly changing threats. One example is Jackal, a highly mobile weapons platform, manufactured in Devonport, which was introduced in Operation Herrick in 2008 in response to such an urgent operational requirement. The report also praises Defence Equipment and Support for its achievements to date, stating that the operation is heading in the right direction and has made good progress in improving the skills of its staff across a range of key acquisition disciplines.
	I think that I am right in saying that the MOD is the only Department to have published its innovation procurement plan—something that all Departments have been asked to come up with to improve public procurement from the private sector, including the important small business sector. The hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth), who spoke for Her Majesty's Opposition, seemed to be saying that procurement was still something of a basket case—those are my words, not his—but that cannot be so, because the Department's approach to strategic management and performance continues to attract interest from wider audiences, including other Departments, local authorities and indeed other nations' ministries or departments of defence. In addition, MOD performance managers are regularly invited to address and take part in international strategic and performance management symposiums. We need to be careful to get the balance right; there are some people in MOD defence procurement working very hard to get the right equipment to our front line in the theatres. It is important that somebody, apart from Ministers, stands up and says that.
	The Defence Committee's third report of the Session on defence equipment did, of course, make some cogent criticisms, some of which have already been quoted. There is one that I particularly want to highlight, because I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) will, in responding, elaborate on what he said about the defence industrial strategy when he was before the Committee. It was originally expected that there would be a second DIS in December 2007, and there was a further deadline in the spring of 2008. When the Under-Secretary came before us, he said that he was "open-minded" about whether it made sense to have an updated version of the defence industrial strategy. My fellow Committee members could not understand that. The strategy is all about protecting the industrial skills bases, having identified the sovereign capabilities that we need. I look forward to his elaborating a bit, in front of the whole House, on what exactly he meant. However, it is of course true that the defence industrial strategy continues to inform the Government's procurement decisions in an important way that helps to maintain the skills base.
	The part of the defence industrial strategy that exercises me and other Members of Parliament from in and around Plymouth and Devonport is the maritime change programme. I want to come back to that and how it affects Devonport at the conclusion of my speech. First, I want to say a bit about the Select Committee programme. Having concluded our work considering the equipment programme, we decided to set out the current state of the armed forces, in terms of readiness and capability, in a series of related areas of MOD policy and activity. We set out how the MOD must act to ensure that the armed forces have the proper training, organisation and capabilities for future challenges, drawing on the MOD's balanced scorecard, which was issued with the defence plan for 2008 to 2012. We hoped that using the MOD's own balanced scorecard would guide us to look in an appropriate way at the matters that are most important to ensuring that the men and women on the front line have the capability to meet the great challenges that we face in Iraq—although to a lesser extent now—and continue to face in Afghanistan.
	Following through on that, we currently have an inquiry on readiness and recuperation for the tasks of today. It looks at preparedness, with regard to equipment in particular. It also considers procuring, training, and the sustainability of the interplay between the two for any new and immediate challenges. We are just setting out on a helicopter capability inquiry, and will then move on to look at an assessment of the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—ISTAR—issues, with a focus on network-enabled capability. A further new inquiry—the comprehensive approach—will include consideration of the lessons that can be learned from experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan and, as part of that, will consider what equipment is necessary for such situations.
	Last week, Plymouth again woke to find stories in the media predicting doom and gloom for its defence sector. This time, they concerned the future base-porting arrangements for our 11 frigates. I understand that tomorrow's local papers contain further doom and gloom with the predicted move away from Plymouth of our submarines. There is a group of people who seem to thrive on talking Plymouth down and the rest of us are not always as vocal as we should be—or as supported by the MOD—in setting out how much Devonport remains at the heart of the MOD and, in particular, the naval service. There is considerable—and understandable —apprehension in the city as we wait for clarity, and that is set against the local backdrop of a 300-year-old relationship with the Navy and a national outlook of very challenging economic circumstances.
	I know that Ministers have visited Plymouth, including my right hon. Friend who opened the debate—he is not in his place at the moment—and the Secretary of State. On more than one occasion my right hon. Friend the Minister of State has come to speak to the strategy group that I set up three years ago and now chair. He has also been generous in ensuring that if he cannot be present, he sends a senior civil servant to almost all our meetings to help to guide our thinking. We have also discussed this subject at length in numerous debates and many uncertainties have already been clarified on the record.
	The Minister has previously stated—and repeated at the strategy group meeting earlier this year—that there will be no changes to base-porting arrangements for the next five years. I hope that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary can confirm when he winds up that that guarantee still stands. Our unique and unsupplantable role as the only location capable of refitting and refuelling nuclear submarines remains, and was recently demonstrated by the signing of the refit contract for HMS Vigilant by the Secretary of State when he visited my constituency.
	The Defence Estates review earmarked Devonport to become the centre of excellence for all deep maintenance—the long, complex refits and overhauls of ship and submarines that are lucrative in terms of money and jobs. Devonport will therefore remain home to the Navy's three large amphibious vessels, together with the relocation of Royal Marine landing craft to create an amphibious warfare cluster. Given the nature of the threats we currently face, and the uncertainty surrounding the threats that may emerge in the future, that is an exciting area of capability at the heart of the defence of our country in the 21st century.
	We also remain the headquarters of Flag Officer Sea Training—a world-class establishment for the Royal Navy and other navies, bringing as many as 50 Royal Navy and foreign warships to Plymouth every year. We are successfully diversifying into other defence markets, notably the production of Jackal armoured vehicles, the relevance of which colleagues and I have seen demonstrated in our visits to Afghanistan. I hope that we will hear an announcement on further orders for those vehicles in the very near future, including variants of the initial model.
	As the MOD struggles to make financial ends meet, I recommend that the Minister remembers certain points in relation to the maritime change programme, which has reached a crucial stage. Devonport dockyard and naval base—and the wider city of Plymouth—have assets and skills that are unique and indispensable. The people of Plymouth and Devonport show a depth of support for defence and the armed forces that is an unrivalled asset in itself and it would be extremely foolish to undermine it. We saw that on Friday when Plymouth people turned out in their thousands to welcome our commandos, especially 29 Commando, home. The Minister, who wrote a recognition report, would surely have been very impressed. There was a service of thanksgiving and a medal ceremony, and the returning troops were greeted with great warmth, dignity and respect for their service over the past six months on deployment in Afghanistan.
	As the maintenance work on submarines and frigates reduces, we have played, and continue to be willing to play, a role in the end-of-life submarine disposal, but in return we expect and deserve the clear and continued support of the Ministry of Defence and a mutually beneficial relationship with the Royal Navy. The Minister and his colleagues have to understand that that willingness comes at a price. That price is that we remain a naval base that is not a pinned-on extra, but the naval base and dockyard that provides the centre of gravity for the Navy.
	Supposedly, we live in the days of joined-up government in which—given that all things are equal between the dockyards in terms of quality of assets and of skills—the Treasury and the Government will expect the MOD to look to wider issues. The issue in which the Treasury and the Government will be interested in above all else is whether they will be handed a hospital pass when it comes to picking up the cost of shrinking the naval bases, which will be higher and more challenging than it need be if Devonport experiences greater shrinkage than the other naval bases. What we do in Devonport provides value for money, and it relies on men and women who are highly skilled—the equivalent of the proverbial rocket scientists—which is something that any sensible Government should value. That is not just because Devonport's facilities, assets and skills base are also flexible and future-proof—two terms that the Minister will have heard applied to warships, but are equally true of the people that built, maintain and man them—but because Plymouth's prosperity has for the best part of several centuries depended on the dockyard and naval base.
	The lamentable do nothing approach towards the dockyard of the Tories from the 1980s and 1990s, and the subsequent dole queues and run-down, are remembered with great fear. In those days, the dockyard employed some 17,000 people. We are now down to 3,500 or 4,000, and that is roughly where it should stay. We need clarity. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State confirmed today some of what he had said to us before, but it is time to get a grip on these issues and give us the clarity we deserve.
	I said in a debate such as this in February 2004 that we were confident that what we had to offer at our naval base provided value for money. We did not want the opportunity that the review offered to be fudged. Nor should the decision be open to challenge. We want fairness, not favour, and I hope that that is what we will hear soon in clear announcements about the maritime change programme and the way ahead for Devonport.

James Arbuthnot: We have just heard an excellent example of why the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy) is such a valued and valuable member of the Defence Committee, although I would quibble a little with her suggestion that we did nothing for Plymouth in the 1990s. I remember spending at least £1 billion there and visiting on several occasions when I was a Defence Minister, because it was so important to entrench Plymouth's role as the future base of our submarines. Although I would quibble with that part of what she said, I agree with almost everything else. I want to follow the structure of some of her comments.
	I want in particular to refer to the Select Committee on Defence's report about defence equipment, which we produced on 26 February. It was, I think, the most damning report that the Defence Committee has produced in this Parliament, and I shall come back to it in a few minutes.
	Let me begin by saying that it is not all bad news. I hope that I do not breach a confidence in saying that about a month ago, along with the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and a number of colleagues from this House and the other place, I was at a function that was addressed by somebody who plays an important part in auditing the accounts of the Ministry of Defence. He drew attention to the way in which the Ministry of Defence, in some ways, is streets ahead of other Government Departments, in this country and in others, in respect of procurement. He said—I think he was right—that some of the best procurements in this country and the Department mirror the best practices in the private sector.
	He also pointed out that this is a field of great difficulty. If we compare the difficulty of the national health service's rolling out across the country a computer system that can communicate with itself, or of doing the same for the many police forces in this country, with the fact that the Ministry of Defence has had to do that with the Bowman communications system, which also has to be stuck in the back of a Land Rover and driven around battlefields in Afghanistan while being jammed and shot at, we begin to understand the complexity of the operation for the Ministry of Defence. Bowman, too, has had its difficulties—I remember them only too well—but it is turning into a real success story.
	The Minister for the Armed Forces commented on the issue of fighting today's wars or tomorrow's wars, and said that in fighting today's wars we do not want irreparably to damage our ability to fight tomorrow's wars, wherever they may be. He is right, but Professor Hew Strachan, who is highly regarded in this field, has written articles and made speeches to suggest that on the current budget we cannot do both: we cannot afford to fight today's wars and tomorrow's wars, and we have to make a choice. My concern is that because of the Government's current strategy, we might be failing to make that choice and failing to fight properly today's wars and to prepare for future wars. That would be the worst of all worlds.
	The Minister moved on to talk of the fleet of urgent operational requirements—I am bearing in mind Mr. Deputy Speaker's strictures about not using acronyms —and the number of military and armoured vehicles that are being bought under the urgent operational requirements system. Many people have already raised the difficulty that urgent operational requirements are beginning to cause.
	The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton was right to say that the Defence Committee drew attention to the success of the UOR system and programme, but nevertheless it produces in the Ministry of Defence a huge range of vehicles that make it much more expensive and difficult logistically to maintain and repair. I visited in my constituency recently one of the military schools that is training mechanics to repair those vehicles, and they are finding it extremely difficult because they have to learn how to repair so many vehicles.
	The UOR system produces casualties and, frankly, I think that the FRES programme is one such casualty. It concerns the future rapid equipment—[Hon. Members: "Effects."] Yes, effects system. We are all beginning to forget what the future aspect of the acronym was meant to mean, but it has now become completely absurd. It certainly was not rapid, it was not particularly for the future, it has not been very effective and to describe it as a system would be ridiculous. In our report, we described it as a fiasco. Now we hear that the Scout variant of the FRES programme is to have priority. I do not think that anybody will have very much confidence in the notion that initial gate will be in 10 months' time.
	As a brand, FRES is meaningless. The Army has never decided what it wants and seems to be attempting to fight the battles of the last century in providing equipment that is mostly aimed at Russian hordes advancing across the German plains. The Government have shilly-shallied throughout the programme and one of the main requirements of the vehicle is that it should fit into an aircraft, the A400M, which, like FRES, looks unlikely ever to exist. The programme is a complete fiasco and it ought to be dropped. To suggest that the Scout variant of whatever it is should be part of a FRES programme would belittle whatever vehicle might come out of that process.
	I am clearly getting into the subject of our equipment report of 2009. We were very concerned across the range. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton mentioned the defence industrial strategy, and that was a good example of one of the concerns that we raised. When the chief of defence matériel appeared before us, he said:
	"I am absolutely clear, the Permanent Under-Secretary has been clear that we will publish DIS 2 as soon as we are able to. Chairman, I really cannot go beyond that."
	Less than a month later, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies), came in front of us and said:
	"Whether it makes sense to have a second version of that, Defence Industrial Strategy 2, is a matter on which I am open-minded".
	Of course, it is true that, as industry has told us, there is no point in having a document that is not backed up by money. It is also true that while the Government are delaying as many decisions as they can until after the general election—I was going to say "as they respectably can", but I think that we are past that point—there is no point in an updated strategy that nobody would believe. We should never have reached this point, however. The purpose of the entire defence industrial strategy was clarity, and that is what we lack and what the defence industry of this country lacks. I am afraid that I think that this is another fiasco.
	Some mention has been made during this debate of aircraft carriers. My main concern about the aircraft carriers is that at the time of the strategic defence review, when a much larger surface fleet and a larger submarine fleet were introduced, the carriers fitted well into the overall balance of our armed forces. Since then, we have been fighting some serious wars. Money has been sucked from the Navy so that the proposed new balance of our forces is wholly skewed. The question now arises of whether the Navy is actually viable. There is certainly a real question about whether the tiny surface fleet that we will have will be able to maintain the sort of presence around the world that this trading maritime country needs and wants. I thought that the strategic defence review, which, when I was a Minister, I wrongly categorised as being a method of putting off decisions, was a very good document, but it is now time to do it again.

Lindsay Hoyle: That is absolutely correct. Some of our so-called allies would not even supply the equipment and ammunition that we needed, so we must learn from those mistakes. It was right to celebrate those who gave their lives in the Falklands, and those who were seriously injured there and took part in yesterday's parade. I pay tribute to the Chorley branch of the Royal British Legion for organising that annual event: we ought not to forget those people who served us so well in the Falklands.
	It is about the best kit, and the kit that we need. It is important, whatever the requirement, whether for helicopters or the new armoured vehicles, that we get the kit into theatre as quickly as possible. We cannot expect those people to risk their lives without the best kit. Part of that kit is the camouflage uniform, which is being made in China, of all places. Unfortunately, the cut and sew contract that we put out to tender was won by a company in Northern Ireland under the pretence that it was going to create jobs. The moment that it won the contract, it moved it to a state-run factory in China. We may hear—and I hope that we do not—that that is about best value, fairness and European competition rules. It has absolutely nothing to do with European procurement rules: the uniform is produced at a state-run factory in China, so there is unfair competition. It is not good for our troops, as there are problems with those uniforms. The camouflage is unique to the British Army, and we should ensure that it is best-print quality. The infrared aspects of that uniform should be correct, but I have to tell the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) that the uniform does not meet requirements. I believe that it is substandard—it is not good enough, and he needs to look at it now.
	The cut and sew contract is coming up for renewal, and I hope that my hon. Friend will make the right decision and ensure that the uniform is made and printed in this country. My constituency has previously done that work, and it is doing the work for most armed forces around the world. In fact, we are supplying the Afghan army with uniforms. The contract was not put out to tender, because we know what a good job that company in my constituency does, so we gave it straight to the company. I hope that my hon. Friend will rethink the situation. We believe in the Warwick agreement—he will have heard about it—and supporting British jobs, which means procurement in this country.

Nicholas Soames: My hon. Friend is partly, but not completely, right. The Germans, for example, bought the Leopard tank instead of the Chieftain because it was said at the time that the Leopard could go backwards faster than the Chieftain could. However, they both had the same gun on them. The hon. Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) was not far wrong in what she said. Nations can each have their own vehicles, provided that they have the same guns and ammunition as those of the nations with whom they are fighting; otherwise, they will get into a terrible muddle.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: Is the hon. Gentleman advocating that we match some of the budget increases in developing nations that, compared with us, have very small armies in proportion to their population? Or is he talking about expanding our budget so that we can expand our armed forces accordingly? If that is the basis of his argument, what does he believe that such as expansion would be for?

Angus Robertson: It is a real honour to follow so many hon. and right hon. Members who speak with great experience on defence matters. I listened especially closely to what the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) had to say on Trident. It was echoed, I think in the same way, by the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin), and I read that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) has said something similar in recent days. So, I very much take the point made about the debate on Trident.
	Perhaps I am one of the usual suspects who take a strong line against Trident, but I very much welcome the fact that people are, perhaps from a different direction, questioning whether it is the right thing to do in the context of such heavy financial pressures on the defence budget, but also in relation to the challenges of this century as we expect them to be.
	I am also pleased to follow the speeches of the hon. Members for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle) and for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy), who spoke with such conviction in support of their constituency defence interests. I want to echo that in discussing procurement matters as they relate to Scotland, and in particular the important role of defence aerospace and naval industries in Scotland.
	According to SBAC Scotland—the trade association that represents the defence sector in Scotland—approximately 170 companies north of the border operate in the sector, employing about 16,000 people. Given that Scottish design engineering and manufacturing in general have a worldwide reputation for excellence, this industry in particular should and will go from strength to strength on the basis of its experience. It is a little-known fact that 59 per cent. of defence aerospace and naval output in Scotland is exported from the United Kingdom, which means that the overwhelming majority is not destined for the domestic market. The global reputation of Scottish engineering excellence will serve the industry well.
	The industry in Scotland has a long history and heritage. That was highlighted by the very successful 90th anniversary celebration of the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund at Edinburgh Castle, which was hosted by the First Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond), and attended by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang). In his address to the large group of supporters of the fund, my right hon. Friend drew particular attention to the production and development of the crucial gyro gun-sights that were used in Spitfires during the second world war. The tradition of technical excellence in defence procurement is a long one, and the development and manufacture of key aerospace defence and naval products and construction has continued to the present day—from world-leading optical and radar equipment to top-of-the-range sea-going vessels and even land mine-clearing equipment.
	Undoubtedly the most important factor in that success is the people involved. It is due not just to one of the finest engineering traditions in the world, but to the steady throughput of trainees, apprentices and graduates learning the high standards of a very high-standard industry. Bearing that in mind, I am pleased that there is cross-party consensus in the form of support for the sector. Whether it is represented by the Prime Minister's visit to Govan last week to see shipbuilders on the Clyde, or by Scottish Government Ministers engaging regularly with the sector to secure a competitive market advantage, all of it should be welcomed. Having said all that, however, I must add that I consider it important to deal with the funding realities of the domestic defence procurement sector.
	The hon. Member for North Essex raised the issue of relative spending on defence matters, without going into the—I think—pretty frightening GDP-related statistics. Defence is the only major area of United Kingdom Government expenditure that has not experienced an increase in spending as a percentage of gross domestic product in recent years, despite high-tempo and high-cost operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As a percentage of GDP, defence spending has fallen from 7.1 per cent. to 2.4 per cent. in the last 50 years. That is understandable in general terms, but the fact that it has fallen from 2.8 per cent. to 2.4 per cent. since 1997 is less explicable.
	In Scotland it is difficult to obtain official confirmation of procurement spending from the United Kingdom Government, although the Minister with responsibility for procurement may be able to answer some of the questions when he sums up the debate. Until the early 2000s, the Ministry of Defence was able to answer questions about defence procurement in Scotland, and I do not really understand why that is not the case now. On 1 February 1999, my predecessor, Margaret Ewing, asked a specific question. I will not give the details, but the question can be found in column 450 of the report. She asked how much the MOD was spending in Scotland on defence procurement and how much of that was passed by sub-contractors. The answer to that question was detailed and helpful, but since the introduction of accountancy changes—I understand that that is the excuse given for the impossibility of answering similar questions now—the MOD has been unwilling or unable to give equally detailed answers.
	Amazingly, the MOD cannot tell us what overall MOD expenditure is in Scotland. It cannot tell us what MOD personnel expenditure or procurement expenditure is in Scotland. It also cannot tell us what the projected costs are of MOD contracts placed with companies in Scotland, or the cost of MOD research and development expenditure in Scotland, or about Defence Bills Agency spending in Scotland, Defence Bills Agency procurement related to spending or expenditure by MOD bases in Scotland. These are all questions that I have put to the MOD, but none of them have been answered. However, all the past evidence points to a significant procurement and wider defence underspend in Scotland relative to tax contributions from Scottish taxpayers.
	The lack of transparency in that context is matched in respect of offset. I asked the Minister of State about this issue at the beginning of the debate, but, to be charitable, perhaps he had not been advised on it for today's debate as he did not seem to understand why it is important. However, if one understands that military offset is a Government-negotiated agreement that requires a supplier of military equipment to direct some benefits—usually work or technology—back to the purchasing country as a condition of the sale, one understands why it is of importance. It is of such great importance to the United States Defence Department that it publishes annually a large document listing all information about offset arrangements, so that our colleagues in the US Congress and Senate can understand those offset contracts. We do not have that here, however, so we have very little understanding of the value that offset provides to companies operating in the UK in terms of their trade in this important sector. Frankly, that is not good enough.
	I am very much in favour of the valued Scottish defence sector having the following: a competitive taxation advantage, decision making close to production, and guaranteed full value of domestic defence spend, whether direct contract or through offset, which does not happen in the UK. I am, of course, also in favour of the Scottish Parliament making decisions on all these policy areas. Members have rightly scoffed at Parliaments or powers elsewhere making decisions about defence policy as it impacts on, from their perspective, the United Kingdom. I am in exactly the same position: I think it frightfully odd that a Parliament 550 miles away from my country makes decisions about our defence and procurement policy—but I have no doubt that that will change for the better in the years ahead.
	A Scottish Parliament and Government making decisions about defence procurement will allow us to continue with shared UK programmes where that makes sense and is properly managed, and to provide alternatives where that is not the case. It must be in the interests of the MOD in London to partner with neighbouring nations interested in making bulk purchases of expensive pieces of equipment, thereby bringing down the unit cost; surely no Minister in Whitehall would gainsay something like that. However, if in Scotland any procurement projects were not in either the taxpayer's interest—we have heard a litany of them today—or the national interest, it would make eminent sense for Ministers in Scotland to be able to decide not to buy into them. However, so long as Scotland does not have the power to make such decisions, we will go on contributing to the UK Treasury, and throwing good money after bad in many procurement policy areas.
	I would like to conclude by turning to an area that has not been discussed, but which will be of growing importance: satellite and space technology. I do not need to talk at length about the military applications, as that should be obvious to anybody who understands anything about these matters. However, of particular interest is the fact that we are only a few short years away from commercial space flight operating from the UK. There are the beginnings of a significant satellite sector in the UK, and I greatly encourage the MOD to look as closely as possible at this.
	I must declare an interest: the leading, preferred site for the launch of commercial space flight in the United Kingdom is Lossiemouth.  [Interruption.] I am glad to have such vocal support from right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House. I had a successful meeting with Lord Drayson a few weeks ago, and I very much sensed from that meeting that the UK Government are seized of the opportunities that that technological development offers. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies), will take forward the development of space technology and commercial space flight from a site in the UK, wherever that site may be, although I of course believe that Lossiemouth is the best place for it. That development really would afford a whole range of options to the defence and aerospace sector, and it is worth pursuing it before other countries get there first.

Ben Wallace: It is certainly a pertinent time to have this debate, just a few days before the Budget. Our armed forces face an incredibly high tempo of operations; they are probably more overstretched than they have ever been. At the same time, their equipment perhaps faces the prospect of basically being worn out. Some of the equipment in the field today has been there not for weeks or months, as was the design in some cases, but for years.
	This Prime Minister is no different from many of his predecessors in sometimes failing to recognise that defence costs. So does defence deployment and time. The Ministry of Defence is often up against it when it comes to budget. I am acutely aware of the history. Historically, we have always tried to play catch-up with the threat. I would like to blame the Labour Government for finding themselves in that predicament, but it is not a new phenomenon. For centuries we have invested in the wrong technology, or had troops in the wrong part of the world when a threat has appeared elsewhere. We always do our very best to catch up.
	As both a former soldier, and a former civil servant who worked briefly at the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency before it became QinetiQ, and then at QinetiQ, I have experience of both sides of the coin. Having served, I have needed equipment as an infanteer and in the armoured infantry, as a Warrior commander. However, I have also been involved in trying to get money out of the MOD and in supplying the equipment to the front line. I am aware of the tremendous effort made in the MOD by officials, members of the armed services and indeed Ministers to try to get resolution to the problems that our forces face daily.
	One thing that we can say about the MOD is that historically, under all Governments, it has been a can-do Ministry. When I meet Ministers who have been in the Ministry of Defence and have then gone to other Departments, they nearly always say to me, "I could teach them a thing or two in this Department, with what I have learned in the MOD. I'd have the MOD running half of Whitehall." I often hear Ministers saying that—and I hear it just as much from the Government Benches as from my party's Benches. We should not forget in today's debate that there are hundreds of successful stories of defence procurement. It goes on all the time, producing good kit for our soldiers, and allowing our armed forces to do their job and to maintain their standard, often in the face of the enemy, although they are now under greater pressure—I wish it was not so—and although there are strained budgets.
	My right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) raised the issue of the Treasury. We are always calling on our Ministry of Defence to reform—to reform how it procures its equipment, or how it deploys its assets or forces—but we seldom hear about the Treasury being forced to reform. Far too often, extra expense or waste in the MOD is caused by the Treasury's insistence on short-term measures being taken in the defence budget, rather than engagement in understanding the long-term needs of defence procurement.
	There are a number of examples; the private finance initiative is a good one. Treasury figures that I eventually managed to get hold of show that by 2015, 4.5 per cent. of the whole defence budget—not just the capital budget, but the capital and revenue budget—will be taken up by PFI payments for a range of projects. That is a huge figure. Some £1.7 billion a year will be spent on paying off the mortgage broker, effectively. The chart given to me by the Treasury covers the next 32 years; I will have long left the House by then. I suspect that some of us will be in our boxes by that time. That is a long mortgage—my mortgage is only 20 years—and we have to ask what we have locked ourselves into.
	Another example was the time when the MOD wanted to buy four C-17 heavy-lift aircraft and the Treasury said that it could not buy them and would have to lease them. Some £769 million was spent leasing them for five years, after which the MOD was allowed to buy them at the original offer price of £200 million. If that is not an example of a huge waste of money caused by Treasury demands, I do not know what is.
	We have to insist that the Treasury accepts some reform. That is easy to say, and I am sure that the door would be slammed in my face, but I want to recognise the efforts that Defence Ministers in this and previous Governments make in day-to-day battling against the demands of the Treasury.
	My specific warning in that area concerns tranche 3 of Typhoon. In an intervention on the Minister earlier, I said that when we failed to take decisions about tranches 1 and 2, it cost the taxpayer £100 million in penalty payments. We dithered over the decision, production stopped and the contract meant that we had to pay compensation. Such penalties also exist for tranche 2 to 3. The Minister did not want to speculate, but he will know the likely cost if we do not make a decision on tranche 3 by May, or if the Germans fail to make a decision by the end of the year. That will be money wasted. The Government may be looking forward to blaming the Germans—a familiar pastime for many in this country at some stage—but they cannot say, "We have had to cancel tranche 3, but it's the Germans' fault—they have had an election and decided to delay." That will not be an acceptable excuse, because the Government have enough power within the consortium to achieve some resolution and push ahead.
	There are real procurement challenges ahead in the next few years, not just in the long-term strategy for our armed forces and our position in the world, but in refurbishing the equipment that we already have and that is wearing out. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) and I recently visited Congress. The US army has an office there, and the US colonel we met told us that he had 900 tanks coming back from the Iraq war that needed refurbishing. The challenge for his budget was to restore them to useable condition, let alone replace them with a new model. Such refurbishment will also cost us a lot.
	We will have to make the decision on all the urgent operational requirements—the UORs—as to whether we absorb them into the main defence budget and our defence infrastructure. For example, all the Mastiffs and other vehicles bought for operations in Afghanistan are one-off purchases at the moment, and the decision has not been taken about whether to bring them back and make battalions out of them or to give them to the Afghans. If we bring them back, that will take a large chunk of the budget. In one of the Defence Committee's excellent reports last year, it identified the proportion of UORs that had been brought into the main core of the MOD, and it was only about 5 to 10 per cent.
	The biggest challenge in procurement of services will be post-conflict welfare—the welfare of our soldiers who, like their equipment, may be worn out. Dealing with the mental stress they face will mean the procurement of Army medical services and Combat Stress-type initiatives.
	From the history of procurement, we must learn that we have to insist on flexibility. The point was made by my hon. Friends the Members for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) and for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) that the debate on the super-carrier is not about how much money we should spend or even whether the Navy should have one: it is whether we are reducing the flexibility of our armed forces by putting all our eggs in one basket—or 32 airplanes on one piece of metal in one part of the world, as opposed to a more flexible option.
	When we cut off our flexibility, we get stung further down the line. We withdraw ships from certain parts of the world, and suddenly drugs trafficking across the Caribbean goes through the roof and the next thing we know we have drugs on our streets. Flexibility will see us through these periods with smaller and ever-decreasing armed forces, because that is how we will be able to plug into our closest ally, the United States, and into Europe.
	There are two programmes that I want to mention that need examining within our current budgets. They are perhaps unnecessary—some have been talked about already—or could do with significant improvement. The first candidate for cancellation is the A400M programme. In 2003, with a host of European nations, we set about the purchase of a medium-lift capability aircraft. One reason that we did that was that that aeroplane was built around the concept of the armoured FRES vehicle. We opted for the 23 tonnes lift capacity, while the Germans went for the 26 tonnes capacity. It would be able to fly the new FRES utility vehicle around the world to a medium range—a similar range to that of a Hercules. There is no FRES utility vehicle—I will not hold my breath for it—and it is starting to look like there is a gap.
	Why do we need a medium-lift capability? We have the C-130J Hercules, which has only 30 per cent. less payload capability than the A400M at about 48,000 lbs rather than 65,000 lbs. It has the same range, it is tried and tested and we run 25 of them already. We can use the same crews and will not need to retrain a whole load of people to fly a European A400M. The C-130J has flown and it is being made. The only photograph that anybody will see of an A400M is of the one that they had to tow out of the factory in Spain because the engine did not work. It still has not flown. We are going further along a path that leads to an expensive project, with an upfront purchase of £2.6 billion and a through-life cost over a decade of about £1.8 billion, depending on the exchange rate.
	The A400M is an expensive aeroplane that is untested, that will require the retraining of some of our crews and that is yet to fly. The only defence for continuing to purchase it that I can see at the moment came from the French Defence Minister when he gave evidence to the Senate in March. He said, "We have to have it, because we must have some competition for the Hercules." That was the only answer.

Ben Wallace: Forgive me, but what I do not want to give up immediately is our forces. Our forces will experience a capability gap in medium and lightweight cargo and trooping because the A400M is already two years late. It was due to be delivered in 2011 and will perhaps be delivered in 2013, and it looks likely that it will not even make its fixed cost. The only other plea to keep it going has come from EADS, the German-French conglomerate defence company, which has said, "We might go bankrupt if you don't carry on buying it." I do not see any real long-term need for the A400M, especially as if we cut it now there will be few penalties—we have a three-month moratorium before we have to make a decision. Let us cancel it now and get some C-130Js and some C-17s. Let us get on with this, save the money and get the troops the equipment that they need. This is not anti-European, but the A400M has not worked and it is not going very far.
	The other programme that should be further considered—it is harder to get the figures—is the future strategic tanker aircraft. It is a £13 billion private finance initiative project over 27 years. By 2011—for our £480 million a year defence budget for those 27 years—we will get not a plane. We do not buy the planes at the end. Not only that, but from the PFI deal on which we have embarked we will get eight planes on call at any one time with a further six should we need them. Those other six will apparently operate as passenger planes for charter holidays. There are so many of them that, in an economic downturn, it will be possible for the consortium to raise the money that way. There is already a glut of Airbus airframes around the world—second hand and so on—so the consortium will manage to work out how to raise enough revenue. The worst thing is the sweetener for the PFI project from the MOD: we handed over the monopoly for all air-to-air refuelling capability for that 27-year period. Should we decide that we want to refuel our next generation of helicopters in that way, which the Americans often do, we cannot do so. Should we want to utilise, if we buy the A400M, the refuelling plumbing fitted in the aeroplane, we cannot do so. If we buy the A400M, it will be delivered from the production line with the ability to provide and receive air-to-air refuelling, but we will not be allowed to switch it on, because we have handed over that monopoly to a PFI project for 27 years.
	With the super-carriers, for example, the Americans refuel their fighters with something called a buddy-buddy tank—another fighter carries a fuel tank, and it piggybacks—or they use the V-22 Osprey, a peculiar-looking plane in the marine corps. It is certainly not the same as a strategic tanker, but all those options will be cut off, because we have given the monopoly to a consortium. That is extraordinary—who knows what technology will be developed in 27 years? Twenty-seven years ago, we hardly had colour televisions, so we can only imagine what will happen when we want to utilise a new way of air-to-air refuelling.
	We must look at that. The future strategic tanker aircraft is another aspect of the fact that our partners, whether European or from other parts of the world, are not contributing their fair share to deployments, whether it is the NATO deployment to Afghanistan or the European deployment in Kosovo, or whether it was in Bosnia or wherever. If we look at the tables on tanker-to-fighter ratios for our partner countries, we can see that Belgium has two tankers and 72 fighters. I do not know why it bothers having fighters, so let us look at France, which is the only country comparable to the UK. It has 23 tankers, and 320 fighters. It has a ratio of 13 fighters to one tanker. The Germans have 220 fighters and only four tankers. We expect our allies to share the burdens. We should not buy 14 tankers to ensure that we keep those international deployments going all the time—it is as if our allies need not worry, because the British are always there to back them up with a tanker. We must make sure that in a range of situations, whether involving troops on the ground, equipment, or logistical or strategic refuelling, our partners play their part. One of the saddest reasons for the defence budget being under pressure is that time and time again, Ministers have worked on their European colleagues to come along to produce more and contribute more to Afghanistan and Iraq, but time and time again, they have not delivered. Whether it was delivering ammunition in the Falklands or delivering troops on the ground in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a lot of talk, but seldom is there much delivery.
	We are expecting a lot if we not only expect our defence budget to carry some of Europe's capability but, with the A400M and efforts to support EADS and Airbus with the FSTA, we apparently want our defence budget to carry some of European industry as well. I do not think that we have the money to do that. It is not about being anti-Europe or any other label that some people would want to use; it is about trying to make sure that our troops, and the British interest and front line, receive what they need.
	There are other issues that we need to look at. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) was absolutely right: what we really need is clarity in our defence strategy. We need clarity in our foreign policy, and we need clarity in what the British interest is and where it lies. The Americans are always 100 per cent. sure about what the American interest is, but I often question, certainly at the fag end of this Government, whether there is a clear definition of the British interest. Just as there was clarity in the defence industrial strategy—that strategy paper gave us great hope—if we have clarity on what we want to procure, where we want to go and what Britain's interest is, we will go some way towards helping the defence procurement problem that every Government face.

Andrew Murrison: I must first draw the attention of the House to my entry in the register.
	The last defence procurement debate was on 19 June. Since then, the UK economy has declined further in relation to its peer group, the MOD has continued to fight wars on a peacetime budget, and the Treasury has refined the art of squaring the books by mortgaging the future. Its "spend now, pay later" approach relies on "later" being somebody else's problem—an expedient that Ministers can be sure will be flagged up from now until election day, and well beyond that.
	We have had an excellent and authoritative debate, with 13 contributions from Back-Bench Members. The right hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang) praised the British aerospace industry; of course, he was right to do so. He spoke specifically about the Typhoon Eurofighter and hoped that there would not be the weakening of support from the Government that he perceives.
	The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Willie Rennie) talked largely about jobs in defence manufacturing. He said that delays were about casting off things into the future and increasing costs, which I did not fully understand. Rather bizarrely, he prayed in aid Denmark as evidence that EU defence is a good thing. I would ever so gently remind him that Denmark is exempted from the European security and defence policy, so perhaps it was not the best example to choose. When the Liberal Democrats are in a hole, they should stop digging. The National Audit Office has made it clear that we cannot delay the decision on Trident. I would have thought that the Liberal Democrats would have hoisted that on board by now and would not continually volunteer it as a unique and rather strange element of their slate of policy proposals, such as they are. The hon. Gentleman wants, in effect, to go into the non-proliferation treaty talks in 2010 with the locker bare. He said that he was an idealist, and today we had evidence of that in spade-loads. Does he really think that our unilateral disarmament would convince other countries to do the same? I suspect probably not.
	The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy), who is not in her place, brought us FRES as the French strawberry. We will never think of FRES in quite the same way again. She talked a great deal about Plymouth, a city that I know very well, and she will have been as distressed as I have by the BBC news from Plymouth, which has led today with the story that the naval base there is to be a "nuclear dustbin". She was rather pointed with the Minister for the Armed Forces in suggesting that he should get his finger out. I wonder whether that is precisely what he has been doing in relation to the future of Devonport. I suggest ever so gently that digits are sometimes best left in situ.
	My right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) spoke magisterially as ever and said that we must reconcile ourselves to the almost irreconcilable—the need to fight today's wars and to prepare for tomorrow's. He said that FRES as a brand was now meaningless, with which I certainly agree, and that the Scout vehicle was unlikely to reach main gate in 10 months, as the Minister has suggested.
	The hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle) mentioned cut and sew in connection with the camouflage uniform and put in a bid for Chorley in referring to that contract's renewal. I assume that that will be favourably entertained, since the Prime Minister wants British jobs for British workers. The hon. Gentleman mounted a defence of the beleaguered A400M and hoped that tranche 3 would go ahead, and he called for a "marinised" Typhoon. His remarks may well be prescient.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) highlighted problems with kit in the early stages of Operation Telic. I know that he was right, because I wore and dealt with some of that kit during Operation Telic II. I am happy to say that matters have improved since then, but we have to admit that it was from a low base. My hon. Friend and I might have to differ ever so slightly on aircraft carriers, but I appreciate the perspective of a cavalry officer and am confident that there will always be a place for the main battle tank, although I fear possibly not for horses. He was right, of course, that we have to fight today's wars, but it would be imprudent to sign up completely to the Rupert Smith thesis. State-on-state warfare needs resources that cannot simply be turned on and off. If we admit it as a catastrophic possibility, we must prepare for it now.
	Ministers have used facts and figures with flair and imagination to suggest, with ever-decreasing conviction, that defence is safe in their hands. For example, there is the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies). We have heard a lot from him already this evening, and I hope that he will not mind if I gently pull his leg a little and revisit his claim last month that in displacement terms, our warship building programme is the most substantial since the great war. In his dreams, apparently, he is trying to out-Dreadnought Jackie Fisher.
	We had another look through the looking glass on 24 November in European Committee B, when the Under-Secretary sought to downplay the threat from the European Union to the doctrine of appropriate sovereignty given in the defence industrial strategy and implicit in EC article 296. European security and defence policy and the Lisbon treaty will, of course, degrade our ability to operate autonomously in the national interest by promoting supranational decision making, the European Defence Agency and the scope of qualified majority voting. To the bewilderment of European Committee B and the press, who sadly do not normally take an interest in what happens on the Committee corridor, the Under-Secretary, who is apparently a historian, offered in support of the EU's defence ambitions the assertion that it had put a stop to bloodshed in Transylvania. Why he chose Transylvania I will have to leave to the imagination of others, but there is more than a touch of the Bram Stokers in the horror story of this Administration's stewardship of the equipment programme.
	On 23 February the Under-Secretary told us that the delay in the carrier programme was not the result of the non-availability of the joint strike fighter, which by any reasonable interpretation contradicted his boss's written statement of 11 December. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin made it clear that JSF could be available, if we wanted it, as early as 2014. In the midst of all that confusion, we were denied the opportunity to debate the aircraft carrier programme in a timely fashion. The House needs to know definitively why the programme has shifted right, and why, especially towards the end of their lifespan, six Type 45s, three deployable at any one time, are now reckoned to be enough for the safe deployment of high-value assets, contrary to the strategic defence review.
	The most important bit of kit is, of course, the men and women who serve in our armed forces. Their procurement and the promotion of their through-life capabilities must be our first consideration. We have heard much today about force protection—as well we might, because maintaining public support for distant conflicts, which appear to deliver body bags and little else, will be a challenge for any Administration. History tells us that wars are lost when the home front loses heart. For that reason, if for no other, as we face the long haul in Afghanistan, it behoves us to review our position and bear down further on force attrition. To do that, we must reconsider kit.
	The Minister is right to point out, as he did on 19 June, that vehicles such as the Mastiff tear up the tarmac and alienate the locals. It is right to say that 6x6 wheeled and tracked vehicles look belligerent to a host population. However, the British public expect us to minimise casualties, and those of us who represent large numbers of servicemen demand it. If the Minister is worried about the impact of heavy vehicles on the mission, he must tackle his Administration's attitude to in-theatre air transport.
	I know that Ministers feel each loss as keenly as any of us, but what are we to make of Chinooks mothballed in Wiltshire for years, while commanders grit their teeth and muddle through with what their men call "coffins on wheels"? What is going on when the traffic collision avoidance system—TCAS—anti-collision technology on the Merlin helicopters belatedly leased from the Danes—I raised the matter in June—is considered an optional extra? What are we to make of the continued intransigence about Snatch and the demise of FRES, which was meant to deliver the best in force protection? What happened to the future integrated soldier technology—FIST—that was meant to network fire teams with the command? The US is to operate in that way, but we learn that we are not.
	The hon. Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) spoke expertly about OCCAR and commonality with the European Union on kit. We must be careful not to reinvent the wheel, since NATO stock numbers already exist in the common NATO stock catalogue, which was hard won. I am not sure that we need a duplicate parallel system, which can lead only to confusion.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton) has been described as a military vehicle anorak, in the nicest possible way. She demonstrated her mastery of the subject today.
	My hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) reiterated the central point that, since 2001, the armed forces have been operating well beyond defence assumptions. In the light of that, he was right to say that there has been no fiscal stimulus for defence.
	I recently had the pleasure of sharing a parliamentary trip to Iraq with the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), who spoke today about his party's attitude to defence. I learned many of the points that he made in the debate during that visit in September, and they have not changed much since then. I hope that he will not mind if I disagree with most of them.
	It is always a great pleasure to listen to my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Wallace), who spoke with much authority about the highly technical subject of defence economics. I share his concerns about and analysis of PFIs. Like him, I am worried about the eventual redeeming of mortgages. I appreciated his references to dealing with worn-out troops as well as worn-out kit.
	My hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) followed my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre, so they could agree about the A400M. My hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire said that we should attempt not to argue from a narrow constituency perspective and we all try to do that in such debates. However, it would be wrong not to mark his tireless advocacy for RAF Lyneham, which has been most effective, and appreciated by people in Wiltshire.
	The hon. Member for Colchester (Bob Russell) spoke.
	In February, Ministers kindly arranged for me to visit Afghanistan. The full experience involves a trooping flight out of Brize Norton, knowing full well that departure and arrival times are purely aspirational. My flight did not happen. Nobody will shed any tears over a politician being messed about, but when that becomes the common experience among men and women who are forced to kip down on the floors of airport terminals for days on end waiting for return flights, it behoves those who represent them to ask what is going on. My letter to the Secretary of State for Defence seeking clarification on that point remains unanswered, but a better solution than the RAF's fleet of flying antiques struggling to operate from an airbase that has become notorious must be found.
	Last week, the chief executive of Airbus made an impassioned plea to save the A400M, citing the jobs under threat. He asked rhetorically what alternatives to his aircraft exist, while Boeing prepares to step in with C-17s that are already under active consideration as replacements for the A400M in France and South Africa. Perhaps the Minister might like to comment on that in his winding-up speech and outline his criteria for any new deal that the Government might be hatching with EADS or Boeing.
	I am very sorry that the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (John Smith) is not here, because we have to cover the defence training review. It is one of the biggest items of defence procurement before us, but it is limping towards main gate. Before covering that, however, perhaps we should pause to draw a discreet veil over project Red Dragon and the so-called super hangar. As the National Audit Office reported last month, this spectacular has tipped £134 million down the drain with very little to show for it.
	In relation to the DTR, Land Securities Trillium walked away from the Metrix consortium in December, when the bottom dropped out of the property market on which the financial case for the St. Athan project depends. I find that deeply worrying and I am not reassured by the replacement partner, the French catering firm Sodexo. The MOD's website says that contracts will be signed with the newly constituted Metrix for the DTR phase 1 in the summer. Is that the case?
	Will the Minister let us in on the DTR contingency plan that the MOD commissioned last year for use in the event of Metrix disintegrating? Will he ditch the fig leaf of "commercial in confidence" and say what cuts to training deliverables we can expect as a result of rising project costs? Can we assume that the DTR second package is now dead in the water? What does the Minister say to the main trade union involved, which has pointed out that large numbers of civilian trainers, who are already in short supply, will not relocate to south Wales and that that will impact on the quality of training produced at St. Athan, at least in the short to medium term?
	Although he is not here, I commend the Veterans Minister, who I know takes a close interest in mental health, for his bravery in taking on his opposite number at Richmond House over the Easter break. It would be wrong of me to trespass too much into that territory, because this is a debate about procurement. However, procurement inevitably crosses departmental boundaries. In the current climate, it beggars belief that a Government who truly prioritised the welfare of our servicemen could produce something that they are pleased to call the "new horizons" strategy for improving mental health that does not carry any mention at all of servicemen, service charities or veterans. I hope very much that that situation will be remedied as soon as possible.
	We have heard today that Bernard Gray will report early, having curtailed his consultation. Why is that and why was that issue not covered in the opening remarks of the Minister for the Armed Forces?
	Finally, in his written ministerial statement of 11 December, the Secretary of State said quite specifically that at the end of the MOD planning round in March, we would have a proper and comprehensive announcement on the future of the equipment programme. March has been and gone, but there has been no announcement. Why not?

Quentin Davies: If I know anything about academics, it is that we never get a consensus from any of them, and I have no idea about the assumptions on which that professor drew in making that statement.
	The right hon. Gentleman also raised the issue of the FRES programme, so let me take the opportunity to deal with it. The FRES utility vehicle is not dead; we will make progress this year in going forward with this project, which is essential for the Army over the long term. Indeed, I hope that we will have a FRES utility vehicle in-service within a decade. We will make more progress this year, as I say, and we will make further announcements in due course.
	I couple the FRES reconnaissance vehicle with the Warrior upgrade, which has not been mentioned here, but there are so many common elements, particularly the cannon, that it is important to look at the two things together. I am extremely focused on this; I meet the teams regularly every month or six weeks. I hope that we will be able to go out to competition for it in a few months' time. We really are making as fast progress as we possibly can, so I hope that relieves the anxieties—the understandable anxieties—of the right hon. Gentleman.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle) raised with me, as he often has, the issue of the cut and sew contract and the uniforms, part of which were made in China. I had not before heard the complaints that my hon. Friend brought to the House about shortcomings in the quality of the product—the too high infrared signature and so forth. I will ask about that. My hon. Friend knows that a new contract will be let later this year and I will certainly do my best—it is my responsibility—to make sure that it is negotiated and placed in the fairest possible way. His representations, which are always very powerful, will very much be taken into account; I give him that undertaking. He raised a number of other issues and I am glad to say that he supports the tranche 3 Typhoon.
	On Woodford, the future of the Nimrod programme and where we go with the MRA4 project, which my hon. Friend the Member for Chorley also raised, I said that I would not make any decision until I visited Woodford, which I believe I am doing on Tuesday of next week. I look forward to that visit, but I do not want to hold out any unreasonable expectations. I have said that very clearly to my hon. Friend and his colleagues who come to see me and to the trade unions, as there are very considerable difficulties. So far as Woodford is concerned, it is not the Government's decision, but it is quite clear that BAE Systems does not actually expect the plant to remain open very long anyway because it does not have a successor in the plant for the Nimrod programme. It thus becomes a question, sadly, of redeploying the extremely skilled, effective and valuable work force—in 2012, 2013 or 2014—so it would be quite dishonest to hold out a prospect for their long-term future on that site when the firm itself appears to have taken that decision.
	I move on to deal with the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames), whose contributions to these debates are always greatly valued. I must say that his is the most memorable contribution to the debate and it will be referred to in the months to come. Indeed, it will play a part in the election campaign, because he made it quite clear that he does not believe that we should go ahead with the programme for the 65,000-tonnes carriers.
	That is a pretty dramatic statement to make, but it was even more dramatic in so far as it was supported by quite a number of the hon. Gentleman's colleagues: the hon. Members for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) and for Congleton (Ann Winterton), as well as, slightly more subtly, the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin). It is quite clear to me that there is a hidden agenda emerging in the Tory party to cancel those carriers. That is a dramatic fact on which the people of this country will need to focus. I can see a clear issue between us at the general election, directly on defence procurement on that particular subject.

Quentin Davies: I will not give way now, because I have too little time.
	I am sorry to say that the debate began with a personal attack on me, and an attack on the Government's record. It was a bit rich for the Conservatives to start talking about the apparent failures of this Government in the field of defence procurement, given that we have an extremely proud record and have done so much in relation to armoured vehicles, naval systems and air power—to which I have just referred—and given their dismal record when they were last in power. They presided over some of the greatest procurement disasters incurred not just in this country but, probably, anywhere. What about Annington Homes? What about the Chinook? How utterly incompetent it was to place that contract without asking where the airworthiness certificates would come from! What about Nimrod? In every business school it is cited as an example of a bad procurement contract. The Tory party was responsible for those failures. It is a bit rich! We have had to clear up the mess; we have inherited the legacy of Tory incompetence.
	It was claimed that I did not say the same when I was a Tory myself—sadly and mistakenly. I am proud to have changed my coat now, by the way, and if the hon. Member for Aldershot calls me a turncoat every day, I shall be delighted. I am wearing the right coat. I am wearing the coat of the party that now represents all the things that I have believed in for as long as I have been in politics.  [Interruption.] Oh, yes.
	What is more, I did say the same about defence. Not only did I say the same about defence, but I wrote the same about defence during the period of the last Tory Government. I have been able to put my hand on a pamphlet that I co-authored with a number of colleagues in 1995. It deals with the Tory Government's record, and it proves that I was saying the same things then. It is an interesting pamphlet. Let me read out the names of the colleagues who co-authored it. There is the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier), who, then as now, was acknowledged to be a great expert in military matters. He was the guy who conceived the project and chaired our meetings. There is Davies: he is number two on the list, because he drafted most of the material. There are Allison, Duncan Smith, Fishburn, Garnier, Goodson-Wickes, Hargreaves, Mans, Robathan—it is an interesting group of characters—Taylor and Riddick. And what did we say in 1995? We said that a vacuum in strategic policy, combined with large reductions in defence spending, had led to severe overstretch and to a fall in morale in our armed forces. We went on to say that morale was at an historic low point, and that defence procurement was thoroughly inadequate.
	All that was said in 1995. The hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) made the disgraceful suggestion that I was talking rubbish—or, he implied, uttering an untruth—when I said what I had said at that time was exactly what I am saying now about the Tory party, and I think that he should apologise.

Anne Begg: In the United Kingdom, 7.8 million people live with pain, day in and day out; that is the equivalent of about one in seven people in every single parliamentary constituency. I have asked for this debate in order to draw attention both to their problems and, more importantly, to some solutions that would not only improve the quality of life of so many of our constituents, but also reduce public expenditure on health, social care and incapacity benefits. If anyone is wondering why I, as a Scottish MP, am raising the issue of pain management services in England when health is a devolved issue, it is because I am the chairman of the recently set up all-party group on chronic pain. I suppose I should also declare an interest: I am one of the 7.8 million people in the UK who live with chronic pain.
	There could not be a better opportunity to consider the problem and suggest solutions. People in pain and the health professionals helping them have been pushing at a closed door for many years now. They have argued for early recognition of the needs of people in pain, early access to expert advice and treatment, and referral to a specialist pain clinic when necessary. That door was closed until recently; suddenly, it looks as though it is opening, and I am grateful to the chief medical officer for beginning that process. His latest annual report, only just published, includes a chapter called "Pain: breaking through the barrier". Sir Liam Donaldson looks at the issue of people living with pain in a sensitive and comprehensive way, and concludes with this statement:
	"A major initiative to widen access to high-quality pain services would improve the lives of millions of people."
	The all-party group that I chair and voluntary and professional groups represented on the Chronic Pain Policy Coalition agree with that conclusion and are committed to ensuring that the vision set out in the CMO's report moves from recommendation to practical implementation. That means making improving pain services a priority for the Department of Health, and for every strategic health authority, primary care trust and provider to NHS trusts. That is because pain is part of a patient's experience, in GP surgeries as well as in acute hospital wards and in operating theatres. Patients may discuss their pain and its management with any number of health professionals, including a pharmacist, a nurse, a physiotherapist or their GP, yet effective co-ordinated services are few and far between.
	The evidence suggests that although pain services do exist in most secondary care NHS trusts, they are patchy, and variable in their resources and in the services that they provide. Crucially, the CMO's report makes this point: each year, more than 5 million people in the United Kingdom develop chronic pain, but only two thirds will recover. Clearly, much more needs to be done to improve outcomes for patients. He reminds us that pain affects 7.8 million people, and that more than a third of households have someone in pain at any given time. Those figures are rising. Indeed, recent surveys suggest that chronic pain is more common now than it was 40 years ago.
	Pain is becoming more common, but the effect that it has on individual lives is immense. The CMO highlights the fact that pain has a major impact on people's lives, causing sleeplessness and depression, and interfering with normal physical and social functioning. That often leads to unemployment. He points out how it affects all age groups. Perhaps most worryingly, he states that 8 per cent. of children experience severe pain, that back pain alone costs the economy £12.3 billion per year and that early intervention may prevent pain from becoming persistent. In fact, it has been shown that the cost of chronic pain is greater than that of heart disease or diabetes.
	Looking at the limited number of specialist pain clinics, the CMO points out that systems and infrastructure do not meet need or demand, and that better co-ordination of services, and services designed around patients' needs, are essential. Pain needs to be considered in its own right, because it is often the pain that dominates the patient's life, not the illness or condition that causes the pain. As one patient has said:
	"At first I presumed the pain would eventually go away and I would get better. I didn't expect to develop chronic pain, or that it would stop me working and lead me to consider suicide. I just want my life back."
	Another said:
	"I am in constant and debilitating pain, often unable to do even the most simple activity such as making myself a cup of tea. I have daily bad headaches, and have no quality of life. It is making me very depressed and life is hell."
	Clearly, we have a duty to ensure that the individual has access to the right treatment as early as possible. That treatment has to come from a properly trained professional, and a multidisciplinary team if needed.
	I was surprised by the amount of interest that this debate has generated. I have been contacted by a number of organisations wishing me to raise their concerns. Age Concern and Help the Aged have particular issues relating to the elderly. They say that pain is not a normal part of the ageing process, and we should not accept it as such. We should challenge discrimination and ageist attitudes with regard to pain in older people. They say that constant pain can lead to a loss of dignity. Some 90 per cent. of calls to Arthritis Care's helpline concern pain, most of them from people in severe pain. In the UK, pain crises account for 60 to 80 per cent. of emergency presentations in hospital admissions for sickle cell disorder.
	This is not the first time I have had an Adjournment debate on the issue of pain. Ever since the Government first indicated that they intended to withdraw the analgesic co-proxamol, I have been trying to persuade Ministers that it should not be completely withdrawn as a small group of people still has not been able to find an alternative and certainly not anything so effective. These are all people who suffer chronic pain, who are saying that only co-proxamol works not because they want to be awkward but because it allows them to carry on with their life. One person in that position has said:
	"With co-proxamol I had pain but it was bearable, now I can walk only a few steps before being forced to rest; before I managed to tend my flower garden, now I can only sit and feel depressed with pain and frustration".
	I have several constituents who depended on co-proxamol but cannot now get access to it. While the Government say that co-proxamol is available on a named patient basis, that is of cold comfort to those whose GPs are refusing to prescribe the drug at all. GPs are not comfortable prescribing off licence as they do not always feel that they have the specialist knowledge. But consultants at pain clinics do.
	The main reason the Government gave for withdrawing co-proxamol was the suicide statistics. As it is now extremely difficult for even those who need the drug to access it, the incidence of suicide attributed to co-proxamol is now tiny. However, the use of stronger pain relief and particularly opiates has grown. A recent  Pulse article says that there has been a 44 per cent. rise in prescriptions for morphine and a 61 per cent. rise in tramadol prescriptions. That cannot be good pain management, so I ask the Minister to look at this issue again.
	I have not, however, sought this debate to lay blame at the Government's door on this matter: rather, I hope to encourage the Minister to consider the recommendations laid out in the chief medical officer's report and to give due regard to their feasibility. I do not have time to discuss them all, but I do want to take this opportunity to bring some to the Minister's attention.
	First, training on chronic pain should be included in the curriculum for all health professionals who deal with patients. I am aware that some progress has been made on this already. At an international level, the International Association for the Study of Pain has produced a core curriculum for all aspects of pain management. In the United Kingdom, the Faculty of Pain Medicine of the Royal College of Anaesthetists has described the core competencies for trainee anaesthetists wishing to be consultants in pain medicine. However, it is vital that this core training is extended to all health professionals, and in particular to GPs who, at the very least, should have pain training as part of their standard undergraduate education.
	Secondly, consideration should be given to the inclusion of the assessment of pain and its associated disability in the quality and outcomes framework—QOF—in primary care. That is an extremely important point, because the inclusion of pain assessment in the QOF would strongly encourage health professionals to be proactive and to ask a patient about their pain, treat it promptly and reassess it to ensure that the treatment given is effective, rather than expecting the patient to raise it first. A recent report on osteoarthritis found that 50 per cent. of people said that they would need to be in frequently unbearable pain before considering seeing their GP—clearly this is a significant barrier.
	Another recommendation was that a pain score should become part of the vital signs monitored routinely in hospital. Indeed, the Chronic Pain Policy Coalition has been campaigning for some time now for pain to be adopted as the fifth vital sign. If implemented, this recommendation would ensure that health professionals become proactive in asking their patients about pain. People would recover faster and reduce the burden of care on others.
	The final recommendation I want to highlight relates to the development by experts of a model pain service of pathways of care with clear standards. The work could build on the excellent 18-week cross specialty chronic pain pathway developed by patients and clinicians that has been supported by the Department of Health. It is an important step forward and should be extended to ensure that all patients are offered comprehensive treatment options. That would improve rapid access and reduce the current variability in treatment that patients receive. Patients need to be confident that they can be offered effective options wherever they live.
	Commitments have already been made both in Scotland with the "Getting to GRIPS with Chronic Pain" report and in Wales under the "Designed for Life" programme to assess and improve the services available for patients with chronic pain. I hope I have shown the Minister that there are patients, third sector organisations such as Arthritis Care and health professionals in England anxious to get hold of these recommendations and take them forward. They will need encouragement and flexibility in the way in which integrated services are funded and in how outcomes are measured.
	Above all, people in pain need a champion. Tsars such as Mike Richards for cancer and Roger Boyle for cardiology have shown how such champions can make a difference. Pain affects cancer patients and heart patients as well as millions of others with back pain, arthritis, pelvic pain and a multiplicity of conditions. Surely the numbers involved and the importance of early intervention demand a pain champion.
	I know that the concerns I have raised in this debate are shared by a number of my hon. Friends and indeed by many of their constituents. I thank the Minister for hearing me out, and I hope that she can give consideration to the points I have raised.